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Marianne Buckley∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suffering from persistent headaches and finding no relief from 
aspirin, Simon traveled from his village in Kenya to Nairobi, Kenya’s 
capital, to see a doctor.
1
  The doctor ran some tests, which confirmed 
his worse fears: Simon had cryptococcal meningitis, an HIV-related 
fungal infection that can be fatal if not treated quickly.
2
  Not only did 
the doctor inform Simon that he was HIV-positive, he also explained 
that the cost of the lifetime treatment for the infection was ten dollars 
per pill.
3
  At that price, Simon would use up his entire salary in two 
weeks.
4
  Although the same drug sold in Thailand as a generic for ten 
cents per pill, that version was not available to Simon in Kenya.
5
  The 
doctor advised Simon to return to his village without treatment, as 
the cost of transporting a live body home from Nairobi would be far 
less expensive than transporting a corpse.
6
  If the affordable generic 
drug sold in Thailand had been available in Kenya, Simon may not 
have had to face such a desperate situation. 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, expected 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2006, 
Northwestern University.  I wish to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Profes-
sor David Opderbeck, and the editors of the Seton Hall Law Review for their guidance.  
I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support. 
 1 Rachel Cohen, Advocacy Liaison for the Médecins Sans Frontières [Doctors 
Without Borders] Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Congressional Briefing: 
Solving the HIV/AIDS Drug Access Crisis in Africa: Meeting the Challenge to Save 
Millions of Lives and to Mitigate the Orphan Crisis (July 16, 2001), available at 
http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1348. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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Although the United States prohibits the importation of cheaper 
drugs from other countries,
7
 the search for low-priced drugs in other 
areas of the world is increasingly extending beyond a country’s geo-
graphical borders.  Because a drug may sell at a higher price in Coun-
try A than in Country B, a trader in Country A will purchase the drug 
from Country B at a lower price and then sell the drug in Country A.  
The goal of this parallel-trading system is to make drugs more afford-
able for consumers in Country A while generating a profit for the 
trader.  Kenya, in fact, permitted parallel trading beginning in 
2001
8
—likely too late to help Simon, but improving the situation for 
other patients. 
The scenario described above outlines the contours of parallel 
trade.  Parallel trade is premised on the economic principle of the 
free movement of goods and incorporates the patent-law concept of 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
9
  A key feature of an in-
tellectual property system is the exclusive rights given to an inventor 
to prevent others from producing, selling, or distributing his inven-
tion for a specified period of time.
10
  Exhaustion occurs when an in-
tellectual property right holder’s control over his invention ceases.
11
  
This cessation of intellectual property rights can happen in different 
ways depending on the type of exhaustion doctrine the country of 
importation has adopted.
12
 
The choice of an exhaustion doctrine correlates to the preva-
lence of parallel trade in a country.  For example, the United States 
follows the doctrine of national exhaustion, which means that an in-
tellectual property right holder’s rights do not end until after the first 
 
 7 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2006) 
(“[N]o drug . . . which is manufactured in a State and exported may be imported in-
to the United States unless the drug is imported by the manufacturer of the drug.”). 
 8 Ben Shianya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS 
Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION 
CASE STUDY 19 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm. 
 9 See Commission Communication on Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products 
for Which Marketing Authorisations Have Already Been Granted, at 6, 10, COM (2003) 839 
final (Dec. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products]. 
 10 JACOB ARFWEDSON, INST. FOR POL’Y INNOVATION, RE-IMPORTATION (PARALLEL 
TRADE) IN PHARMACEUTICALS 1 (2004). 
 11 Duncan Matthews & Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Parallel Trade: A User’s Guide, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A 
HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1429, 1432 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007).  
 12 International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.htm 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  
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sale of the protected product in the United States.
13
  Hence, accord-
ing to the national exhaustion doctrine, a right holder cannot limit 
the commercial exploitation of the product within the domestic 
country, but it can still refuse to allow importation of the product 
from other countries into the domestic market.
14
  Conversely, under 
the doctrine of international exhaustion, an intellectual property 
right holder’s exclusive rights cease after the first sale of the product 
in any market in the world, and a right holder can no longer exclude 
the product from entering the local market from other countries.
15
  
Thus, the type of exhaustion doctrine selected by a country will either 
promote or restrict the parallel trade of goods because the doctrine 
determines whether the right holder can prevent parallel imports of 
the patented product from entering the domestic market.
16
 
Once the intellectual property rights protecting a product are 
exhausted, the inventor can no longer dictate the terms governing 
the sale of his product, and the notion of the free movement of 
goods applies.
17
  The concept of the free movement of goods means 
that a product may be sold in other countries without restrictions and 
the right holder cannot prevent the product from entering new mar-
kets.
18
  The product sold in a new market is called a parallel import.
19
  
Parallel trade is driven by price differences for similar products be-
tween countries.
20
  Importantly, parallel trade does not refer to illegal 
activities, nor should it involve the trade of counterfeit goods.
21
 
 
 13 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432. 
 14 International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, supra note 12.  
 15 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See generally LENNART RITTER, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE 745–47 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that intellectual property rights are subject 
to the rules of the free movement of goods in the EU). 
 18 See RITTER, supra note 17, at 747 (noting that once patent rights are exhausted, 
the patentee cannot prevent the importation of the goods); David R. Bumbak, Indus-
trial Property Rights and the Free Movement of Goods in the European Communities, 16 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 381, 381 (1984) (describing the inherent tension between exclu-
sive intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods); David T. Keeling, 
The Free Movement of Goods in EEC Law: Basic Principles and Recent Developments in the 
Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 26 INT’L LAW. 467, 467 
(1992) (explaining that the principle of the free movement of goods means that 
goods placed on a market can be freely traded throughout, for example, Europe, 
and that such goods cannot be subject to any restrictions). 
 19 Parallel imports are also referred to as “grey market goods.”  International Ex-
haustion and Parallel Importation, supra note 12.  This Comment, however, will use the 
former term. 
 20 Thomas N. Bart, Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals: A Review of Legal, Economic, 
and Political Aspects, 11 VALUE IN HEALTH 996, 997 (2008); Press Release, Eur. 
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Although parallel trade applies to all types of goods, the trade 
mechanism is particularly relevant in the public health sector because 
of conflicts over pharmaceutical drug pricing and patent rights.
22
  An 
inherent tension exists between the exclusive protection granted by 
patents and the cost of and access to drugs by consumers.
23
  This ten-
sion is apparent in the public health crisis facing places like Africa, 
where the cost of drugs is high, and therefore, drugs are inaccessible 
to much of the population.  Importantly, although focus has primari-
ly been on the lack of affordable drugs in developing African coun-
tries as compared to the United States and Europe, drug prices with-
in Africa vary widely.  For example, a study found that the price of a 
drug sold in Uganda was 124% higher than the price of the same 
drug sold in Ethiopia.
24
 
Even though parallel trade has the potential to cut drug costs for 
consumers,
25
 the system is not without its critics.  A common argu-
ment against parallel trade is that it hurts innovation because phar-
maceutical companies are less likely to invest in research and devel-
opment of new drugs if their profits decrease because of the 
availability of cheaper drugs from other sources.
26
  Pharmaceutical 
companies have actively attempted to fight parallel imports.  For ex-
ample, in 2007, Pfizer brought a suit against the Philippines for im-
porting a cheaper version of its patented hypertension drug from In-
dia.
27
  Parallel trade, therefore, is as controversial as it is critical. 
 
Comm’n, MEMO/04/7 Commission Communications on Parallel Imports of Pro-
prietary Medicinal Products—Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 19, 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (select “Search Complete Database” under 
“Date Range”; then enter “MEMO/04/7” in “Reference” field). 
 21 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1429. 
 22 Id. at 1432–33. 
 23 See generally David Henry & Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Medi-
cines Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1590–93 (2002) (describing the lack of affordable 
drugs in developing countries and the use and abuse of patents by pharmaceutical 
companies).  
 24 KRISTEN MYHR, MÉDECINS SAN FRONTIÈRES, COMPARING PRICES OF ESSENTIAL 
DRUGS BETWEEN FOUR COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA AND WITH INTERNATIONAL PRICES 
(2000) (manuscript at 18) (on file with author).  The generic name of the drug is 
ceftriaxone.  Ceftriaxone Injection, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ 
medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a685032.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2010).  Ceftriax-
one sold under the branded name Rocephin by Roche and is commonly used to 
treat infections.  Id. 
 25 Parallel Trade in Medicines, EURACTIV (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/ 
en/health/parallel-trade-medicines/article-117528 [hereinafter EURACTIV]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Elmira Bacatan, Access to Medicine: Drama Unfolding, OXFAM EAST ASIA BLOG 
(May 13, 2008), http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastasia/?p=80.  
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Despite criticisms, the parallel trade of pharmaceutical drugs will 
not likely disappear any time soon and, if anything, it will become 
more prevalent for several reasons.  First, under the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement
28
 and the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Dec-
laration),
29
 World Trade Organization (WTO) countries may select 
the intellectual property right exhaustion doctrine that best suits 
their domestic policy goals.
30
  The least-developed countries have un-
til 2016 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, which requires that 
they provide patent, trademark, and copyright protection.
31
  The 
TRIPS agreement calls for WTO member states to grant patents for 
any invention in all technological fields, which covers pharmaceutical 
drugs.
32
  As the least-developed countries implement patent-law re-
gimes, they may choose to allow parallel trade.  For example, a draft 
patent law in Bangladesh permits parallel trade.
33
  India’s revised pa-
tent law contains a liberal parallel-importing provision.
34
  And South 
Africa, recognizing the potential cost-saving effects of parallel trade, 
authorized the parallel importation of drugs under the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997.
35
 
 
 28 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [he-
reinafter TRIPS Agreement].  The TRIPS Agreement is a multilateral agreement on 
intellectual property.  Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2010). 
 29 WORLD TRADE ORG., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 30 Id. para. 5(d); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and 
Pharmaceutical Patents, Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm#dohadecl
5d (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 31 Press Release, World Trade Org., Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply 
Intellectual Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm. 
 32 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, arts. 27:1, 70:8. 
 33 WORLD BANK, BANGLADESH DEVELOPMENT SERIES PAPER NO. 23, PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACHES TO IMPROVING PHARMACEUTICAL QUALITY IN BANGLADESH 
18 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTBANGLADESH/Resources/pharmaceutical.pdf. 
 34 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, section 58, Acts of Parliament, 
2005 (India), available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/ 
patent_2005.pdf; Shamnad Basheer & Mrinalini Kochupillai, ‘Exhausting’ Patent 
Rights in India: Parallel Imports and TRIPS Compliance, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 486, 
490 (2008). 
 35 See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 § 10 
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70836. 
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Developing countries would not be alone if they chose to open 
their markets to parallel trade.  Europe has a parallel trade system for 
pharmaceutical drugs that continues to grow in response to price dif-
ferences for drugs between European countries.  The Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community
36
 authorized the free 
movement of goods between European member countries and the-
reby established a European parallel trade system based on regional 
exhaustion.
37
  The EU has integrated new country members into the 
existing parallel trade system.  For example, Sweden allowed parallel 
imports of pharmaceuticals when it joined the EU in 1995 so as to 
comply with EU regulations.
38
  Parallel imports are now included as 
acceptable drug substitutes under a generic substitution policy that 
mandates Swedish physicians to prescribe the lowest-priced generic 
substitute for a drug.
39
  Poland, which joined the EU in 2004, doubled 
the number of drugs authorized for parallel importation in 2008; 
sales of parallel imports increased eighty-nine percent in 2008.
40
  The 
parallel trade system in the EU is established and growing, and it illu-
strates the use of parallel imports as a means of cutting health-care 
costs. 
This Comment will argue that the African Union (AU) should 
consider a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion as a 
means of addressing the pharmaceutical drug crisis.  Parallel trade is 
not going away given its strong foundation in the EU and the flexibil-
ity available to developing countries in selecting intellectual property 
right exhaustion doctrines under the TRIPS Agreement.  Although 
much focus is on the lack of affordable drugs in Africa as compared 
to North America or Europe, drug prices also differ between African 
countries.  These price differentials are a motivation for parallel 
trade.  Such price differentials between African countries strengthen 
 
 36 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
arts. 28–30, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf [hereinafter EEC Trea-
ty].   
 37 Under the doctrine of regional exhaustion, the intellectual property rights for 
a patent cease upon the first sale of a product in a regional market.  Matthews & Mu-
noz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432. 
 38 PIERRE MOÏSE & ELIZABETH DOCTEUR, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 
(OCED), OCED HEALTH WORKING PAPERS NO. 28, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND 
REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN SWEDEN 38 (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/17/40699881.pdf. 
 39 Id. at 22, 38.  
 40 IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, POLAND’S PARALLEL IMPORTS MARKET GROWS RAPIDLY IN 
2008 (2009), available at http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail16048.htm. 
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the idea that the AU should explore a regional exhaustion system 
modeled after the EU system. 
Part II of this Comment will introduce the relevant principles of 
parallel trade in the context of pharmaceutical drugs.  It will review 
the EU’s approach to parallel trade and focus on the applicable pa-
tent-law principles, the regulations that govern the EU system, case 
law, and the benefits of and concerns about the system.
41
  Part III will 
examine Africa’s current approach to free trade and intellectual 
property rights and will review the current drug crisis in Africa.  In 
particular, this Comment will highlight South Africa’s experience 
with the parallel trade of drugs.  Part IV will argue that a parallel 
trade system based on regional exhaustion has the potential to in-
crease access to pharmaceutical drugs in the AU.  This Part will re-
view the motivations for implementing such a system in Africa and 
discuss the required support structure, drawing on the EU’s expe-
rience. 
II. KEY PRINCIPLES OF PARALLEL TRADE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
CONTEXT: AN ILLUSTRATION IN THE EUROPEAN APPROACH 
Parallel trade is the mechanism by which products protected by 
intellectual property rights—from a patent, trademark, or copy-
right—are placed into circulation in one market and then exported 
to a second market and sold without the authorization of the intellec-
tual property right holder.
42
  The consequence of parallel trade is that 
a protected product is available from multiple sources: the right 
holder and traders or dealers.
43
  The main motivation for parallel 
trade is price differences between countries for goods.
44
  But the ex-
tent to which parallel trade is established in a country or region de-
pends on the exhaustion doctrine that has been implemented by the 
local or regional government.
45
  Because of the research-based, pa-
tent-protected nature of the pharmaceutical industry, parallel trade is 
particularly relevant in the context of prescription drugs.
46
  Yet it is 
 
 41 This Comment does not focus extensively on economic principles.  Instead, 
this Comment will examine parallel trade primarily from the perspective of intellec-
tual property law. 
 42 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 1.  This Comment focuses on patents, specifically 
of pharmaceutical drugs. 
 43 Id.; see Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20 (“[P]arallel imports play an 
important role in preventing compartmentalisation of national markets.”).   
 44 EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 45 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432. 
 46 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6. 
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precisely because the stakes are so high and because so many players 
are involved in the pharmaceutical industry that parallel trade of 
drugs is controversial.  The current parallel trade system for drugs in 
the EU illustrates the potential benefits of and issues surrounding this 
trade mechanism. 
A. Price Differences Between Countries Drive Parallel Trade Systems 
Parallel trade is motivated by price differences between coun-
tries for similar products.
47
  A wholesaler in the country where the 
product is available at a low price can make a profit by selling the 
product in a country where it is currently sold at a higher price.
48
  
The main contributors to price differentials between countries in-
clude variations in intellectual property right protection, consumer 
purchasing power, government price regulation, inflation, tax rates, 
and marketing strategies.
49
  Thus, these factors indirectly fuel parallel 
trade. 
Many players operate within an economic market, and, as such, 
parallel trade affects several parties.  The obvious example is con-
sumers, who benefit from lower-priced products, although the exact 
amount of resultant savings to the consumer is uncertain.
50
  Another 
group affected by parallel trade is the patent owners and local licen-
sees.  Patent right holders oppose parallel trade because they receive 
direct benefits from exclusively importing their protected product.
51
  
Patent right holders often set the selling price and parallel trade un-
dermines the ability to control price by introducing competition.
52
  
Conversely, the presence of competition allows retailers, wholesalers, 
and traders to make a profit on the sale of parallel imports.
53
  Finally, 
governments play a role in parallel trade systems because they may set 
price controls, which contribute to price differentials between coun-
tries.
54
  Parallel imports may result in savings for governments that, 
for example, reimburse patient health-care costs.
55
  Additionally, gov-
 
 47 Bart, supra note 20, at 997; EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 48 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6. 
 49 Id. 
 50  Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430; EURACTIV, supra note 25; see 
also Parallel Distributions in Medicines—FAQs, EUR. ASSOC. OF EURO-PHARMACEUTICAL 
COS., http://www.eaepc.org/faq/index.php?n=6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting 
that another effect of parallel trade is the creation of additional jobs). 
 51 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1431. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20. 
 54 Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products, supra note 9, at 6. 
 55 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430. 
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ernments may select or promote parallel trade as a public policy me-
chanism to ensure consumer access to certain goods, such as drugs.
56
  
As such, a variety of economic factors contribute to the price differ-
ences for goods between countries that drive parallel trade systems.  
But it is local and regional governments, with the power to select an 
exhaustion doctrine, that determine whether a functioning parallel 
trade system is launched in the first place. 
B. The Correlation Between the Selection of an Exhaustion Doctrine 
and the Existence of a Parallel Trade System 
The concept of exhaustion emerges at the crossroad of intellec-
tual property rights and economics.  Patents give inventors the rights 
to exclude competitors from producing, selling, and distributing 
their invention for a specified period of time, typically twenty years 
from the filing date of the patent application.
57
  Accordingly, the legal 
question regarding parallel trade is as follows: “To what extent should 
countries allow or limit the ability of [intellectual property] right 
holders within particular national/regional territories to control the 
movement of products across different markets on the basis of local 
ownership of [intellectual property] rights?”
58
  This question is ans-
wered in part by the exhaustion doctrine implemented by a country 
or group of countries, which outlines the interaction between intel-
lectual property rights and market forces. 
The three types of exhaustion doctrines are national exhaustion, 
regional exhaustion, and international exhaustion.  Under national 
exhaustion, the exclusive rights of a patent holder over his protected 
product cease after the first sale of the product within national bor-
ders.
59
  Therefore, although patent holders cannot block sales within 
the country, they can prevent parallel imports from outside the coun-
try’s borders.
60
  The second type of exhaustion is regional exhaustion.  
Here, the exclusive rights of a patent holder end after the first sale of 
the patented product in a regional market.
61
  The EU follows regional 
exhaustion, which means that parallel imports are allowed between 
member countries but are blocked from countries outside the EU.
62
  
The third type is international exhaustion, which is the exhaustion 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 1. 
 58 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
BUCKLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:08 AM 
634 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:625 
doctrine with the widest scope.  Under this approach, the patent 
rights granted to an inventor cease after the first sale of the patented 
product in any market in the world.
63
  India, Malaysia, Taiwan, Israel, 
and Argentina are examples of countries that adopted international 
exhaustion.
64
  In these countries, patent holders cannot prevent pa-
rallel imports from entering the local market by relying on intellec-
tual property rights alone.
65
 
No legally binding global agreement governs the exhaustion of 
patent rights.
66
  Under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declara-
tion, WTO member countries can select the exhaustion doctrine that 
best fits their individual domestic policy goals.
67
  This essentially 
means that parallel trade is a matter of national interest.  A variety of 
factors can impact the choice of exhaustion doctrine and, in the con-
text of parallel trade of pharmaceutical drugs, may include the pres-
ence of a local or regional pharmaceutical industry.
68
 
C. Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents 
and Profits 
The pharmaceutical industry has been particularly susceptible to 
parallel trade.  Parallel trade is driven by price differences between 
goods, and several internal and external characteristics of the phar-
maceutical industry, ranging from strong patent rights over drugs to 
government regulations, impact the price of drugs.  First, the phar-
maceutical industry is an industry protected by patents,
69
 which means 
pharmaceutical companies have the exclusive rights to make and sell 
a patented drug.  Governments grant patents in reward for the signif-
icant research and development efforts required to develop new 
drugs.
70
  Pharmaceutical companies hope to recoup research costs 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Bart, supra note 20, at 998. 
 65 Id. 
 66 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 4. 
 67 Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 5(d) (“The effect of the provisions in 
the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion 
without challenge, subject to the MFN [most favored nation] and national treatment 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4.”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6 (“For the 
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).  
 68 Bart, supra note 20, at 998. 
 69 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6. 
 70 Id. 
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from patented drug-sale profits.
71
  Second, the research-based nature 
of the pharmaceutical industry results in a policy of active price dis-
crimination on the part of pharmaceutical companies in an attempt 
to earn revenue.
72
  Third, the pharmaceutical industry is a highly re-
gulated industry and strict governmental drug-approval rules increase 
research costs, which in turn raise drug prices.
73
  Finally, outside fac-
tors such as government-enforced price controls, exchange rates, 
consumer demand, and different intellectual property regimes also 
impact drug prices.
74
  The combination of internal and external in-
fluences on the pharmaceutical industry contributes to the varying 
drug costs incurred by consumers. 
The prevalence of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry 
has generated arguments for and against allowing parallel imports of 
drugs.  Supporters point to the fact that in countries where drug costs 
are high, parallel trade may help lower costs because parallel trade 
increases the supply of drugs, and therefore, increases price competi-
tion.
75
  But opponents of parallel trade argue that pharmaceutical 
companies will be less likely to invest in research and development 
because their profits will decrease due to the existence of lower-
priced parallel imports.
76
  The exclusive right of a pharmaceutical 
 
 71 A. Bryan Baer, Note, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation 
of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 126 (2001). 
 72 See generally id. at 127 (“[P]harmaceutical companies segment the world market 
into discrete geographic regions adjusting price accordingly to maximize their re-
covery of capital.”  This approach incentivizes the development of new products.); 
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20 (noting price discrimination by drug 
manufacturers as a basis for parallel trade). 
 73 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6. 
 74 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430; Baer, supra note 71, 126–27; 
see also Panos Kanavos & Sotiris Vandoros, Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Is 
Parallel Trade the Answer?, 31 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 325, 336 (2010) (finding 
that drug prices are determined by regulation, the presence of generic drugs in the 
market, and the number of competitors in the wholesale market). 
 75 See Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430 (“By increasing the op-
tions for alternative supplies of products, parallel imports can allow consumers to 
gain access to the products they need from another market at lower prices than are 
being charged in their own market.”); Joan Costa-Font & Aaron Burakoff, Comment, 
An Overview of Progress in the International Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 
PIERCE L. REV. 103, 106–07 (2002) (noting that parallel importing “increase[s] both 
supply and price competition . . . .”); EURACTIV, supra note 25 (noting that parallel 
imports may help cut pharmaceutical costs for governments). 
 76 See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceut-
ical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consume Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 187 (1999) (characterizing the pharmaceutical 
industry as a high-technology industry “where parallel imports will inhibit the ability 
of firms to recoup R&D [(research and development)] and other fixed costs and ul-
timately reduce their ability to innovate.”); Costa-Font & Burakoff, supra note 75, at 
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company to market a drug allows it to charge super-competitive pric-
es to recover research-and-development expenses for drugs that went 
to market and for unmarketable drugs.
77
  Without the market protec-
tion that stems from a patent, pharmaceutical companies would not 
have an incentive to develop new drugs.
78
  In rebuttal, supporters of 
parallel trade point to the lack of evidence that parallel trade has 
caused pharmaceutical companies to cut back on research.
79
 
Supporters also argue that implementing a global international 
exhaustion system—that is, a system in which all countries would 
adopt the international exhaustion doctrine—would allow consumers 
worldwide to take advantage of lower prices.
80
  Supporters say that in-
ternational exhaustion of patent rights is consistent with the liberal 
trade policy promoted by the WTO and that the WTO should favor 
open trade over territorial-based restrictions that hinder free trade.
81
  
Opponents, however, respond that price discrimination is a good 
thing.
82
  Besides noting that research and development requires that 
pharmaceutical companies are able to sell their drugs at a profit, 
those against parallel trade argue that price discrimination allows 
companies to offer lower prices in some countries and higher prices 
 
107 (“Since parallel trade erodes the price differences, it undermines the price me-
chanism that pays for research and development.”); EURACTIV, supra note 25 (“Big 
pharmaceutical companies say that, as their profits decrease due to parallel imports, 
they are obliged to invest less in R&D.”).   
 77 Baer, supra note 71, at 126. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Donald Macarthur, Parallel Trading of Medicines: The Case for a Fair Deal, 11 
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 6, 9 (2001) (“Diversion of sales from one European country to 
another has not led to the research-based industry cutting back on research and de-
velopment.  According to the manufacturers’ body, [European Federation of Phar-
maceutical Industries and Associations], spend on pharmaceutical R&D in Europe 
grew more than three-fold from 1985 to 1999.  There is no evidence that capital in-
vestment is affected either.”).  For an argument that parallel trade may increase in-
centives for drug manufacturers to develop innovative drugs by reducing the attrac-
tiveness of drugs that imitate already existing drugs, see Alain Schlaepfer, Innovation, 
Imitation and Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry 1–2 (Aug. 2008) (un-
published manuscript) (presented at the 10th Annual European Trade Study Group 
Conference, 2008), available at http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2008/ 
Papers/Schlaepfer.pdf.  
 80 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2. 
 81 Joan A. Harrelson, Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: 
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER  
L. SYMP. J. 175, 195 (2001). 
 82 See ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2–4 (reviewing a discussion that price discrim-
ination promotes economic development through research while providing for low 
priced essential medicines); Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 187.  
(“[P]rice discrimination . . . will enhance welfare by facilitating entry into new, low-
priced markets and thus expanding output.”). 
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in others.
83
  If a pharmaceutical company had to set only one price, it 
would likely set a price higher than many people could afford.
84
  The 
argument follows that a global system of international exhaustion 
would actually raise prices for consumers in poor countries and shut 
them out of access to affordable medicines.
85
 
In addition to the debate over drugs profits and pharmaceutical 
research, other arguments against parallel trade are also common.  
The amount of direct savings by consumers is uncertain.
86
  Addition-
ally, safety is a concern because faulty repackaging of drugs places 
consumers at risk.
87
  The risk that counterfeit drugs will replace im-
ported drugs is also a fear.
88
  Finally, opponents look to the integrity 
of the patent-law system and note that restrictions on parallel trade 
are a “normal competitive restraint” that is “consistent with the pur-
pose of patent protection.”
89
  But in the face of the arguments offered 
 
 83 See ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2 (noting the argument that if a company 
cannot price discriminate, it will only set one price, and that price would likely be 
higher than many consumers would be willing to pay). 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. (noting the argument that a global regime of international exhaustion 
may hurt the welfare of individuals in poor countries because it would raise prices in 
those markets higher than the average international price); David W. Opderbeck, 
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 554 (2005) 
(“The high demand elasticity in developing country markets makes R&D investment 
too great a gamble for developed country manufacturers if the developed country 
market cannot support monopoly prices.”); Alan O. Skyes, Public Health and Interna-
tional Law: TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2002) (“When parallel imports are possible, by contrast, [pharma-
ceutical companies] will likely become unwilling to sell at low prices in markets 
where demand is weak.  Poorer countries may then find themselves largely priced 
out of the market for particular medications.”); cf. Barfield & Groombridge, supra 
note 76, at 260 (“[P]rice differentials of pharmaceuticals across markets often have 
little to do with the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical firms; rather, it is based on 
government intervention.”).  Barfield and Groombridge stated this proposition in 
support of the argument that parallel trade may do little to create the uniform mar-
ket that supporters of international exhaustion desire.  Id. at 260.  Yet this point also 
weakens the argument that price differentials are required to promote drug research 
and development.  
 86 EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 87 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 260. 
 88 Bryan A. Liang, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: Injecting the Counterfeit Element 
into Public Health, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 847, 852–53 (2006).  The risk that 
drugs with “fake, tainted, different, expired, concentrated, or diluted drug forms 
and/or ineffective materials” could replace legitimate drugs en route to another 
market is a concern.  Id. at 852.  The risk that counterfeits may mix with legitimate 
drugs also exists; this is referred to as “salting.”  Id. at 853.  
 89 Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, 13 PHARMAECONOMICS 293, 
301 (1998); see also Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 215 (arguing that pa-
tent protection is necessary to the pharmaceutical industry because other companies 
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by opponents of parallel trade, parallel trade has managed to take 
hold in the pharmaceutical industry and is most firmly established in 
the EU. 
D. Strong Support for a Single Market and the Endurance of the 
European Parallel Trade System for Pharmaceutical Drugs 
Parallel trade has a strong foundation in the EU.  The Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) permit-
ted parallel trade in Europe.  Articles 28 and 30 of the EEC Treaty 
prohibit national laws that restrict the free flow of goods between 
member countries,
90
 and Article 81 prohibits agreements that attempt 
to restrict the common market with limitations, such as restrictions 
on production and development.
91
  The EU’s desire for a single mar-
ket facilitated the implementation and acceptance of parallel trade.
92
  
Parallel trade contributes to the development of such a market by al-
lowing products sold at different prices to move between the national 
markets of EU members and thereby increasing the availability of 
products to the consumer.
93
 
The free movement of goods in the EU means that no member 
country can place legal, legislative, or other barriers between the 
 
or individuals can easily copy drug compounds).  Economists find that, especially in 
the pharmaceutical industry, “the symbiotic relationship between property rights 
granted through patents and the simultaneous increment to the nation’s ‘knowledge 
base’ through publication of the patent, contributes strongly to technological ad-
vancement and higher economic growth.”  Id. at 259. 
 90 EEC Treaty, supra note 36, arts. 28, 30.  Article 28 of the EEC Treaty prohibits 
“quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect.”  Id. 
art. 28.  Article 30 of the EEC Treaty recognizes that restrictions may be necessary in 
some cases as long as the restrictions do not constitute arbitrary discrimination or 
disguised restrictions on trade between member countries.  Id. art. 30. 
 91 Id. art. 81.  Article 81 of the EEC Treaty forbids “all agreements between un-
dertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market . . . .”  
Id. 
 92 See, e.g., Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft, 
2003 E.C.R. I-3095, 1 C.M.L.R. 39, 1278 (2004) (“[I]n completing the internal mar-
ket as an area without internal frontiers in which free competition is to be ensured, 
parallel imports play an important role in preventing the compartmentalisation of 
national markets.”).  
 93 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20; see also Commission Communication 
on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, at 1, COM (1998) 588 final (Nov. 25, 1998) 
(“The purpose of the completion of the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals is not just 
to provide an environment which is favorable for pharmaceutical innovation and in-
dustrial development, it is also to improve consumer choices in pharmaceuticals of 
the required quality, safety and efficacy, at an affordable cost.”). 
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trading members.
94
  In accordance with this approach, the EU follows 
the doctrine of regional exhaustion.
95
  This means that within the EU, 
parallel trade is not restricted between member countries absent a 
private contract provision.
96
  In some cases, a member country can 
stop or restrict parallel imports if the country shows that restrictive 
measures are necessary to protect human health and life or to protect 
industrial and commercial property.
97
  Parallel imports from coun-
tries outside the EU follow the intellectual property laws of the terri-
tories from which they originated, and consequently, right holders in 
European member countries can ban parallel imports from outside 
the EU based on the principles of regional exhaustion.
98
 
A review of the pharmaceutical parallel-import process in the EU 
provides insight into the mechanics of parallel trade.  First, the paral-
lel importer chooses an EU source country where the product is sold 
at a lower price than in another EU country.
99
  The trader purchases 
the product from a retail vendor in the low-price country who origi-
nally purchased the drug directly from the manufacturer or a li-
censed reseller.
100
  The parallel importer then repackages the product 
so the drug is labeled and contains instructions in the language of the 
receiving country.
101
  To ensure that no alteration of the drug oc-
curred during the repackaging process, the importer must identify 
who repackaged and manufactured the product, the repackaging 
must not damage the reputation of the trademark or its owner, and 
the trademark owner must receive notice before the repackaged 
product goes on sale.
102
  A parallel trader must obtain a Parallel Im-
 
 94 Liang, supra note 88, at 852.  
 95 Bart, supra note 20, at 998.  
 96 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 199. 
 97 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20. 
 98 Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied v. Harlauer Handelsgesellschaft, 1998 
E.C.R. I-4799, 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998).  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Sil-
houette held that a European Commission directive on trademarks only implemented 
an intra-community exhaustion rule: “[T]he Directive cannot be interpreted as leav-
ing it open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of 
the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the market in 
non-member countries.”  Id. at 977.  This means that EU countries “are required to 
uphold the right of trademark owners to restrict parallel imports” from outside the 
EU.  Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 199.  The case is assumed to apply to 
patents as well.  Id. at  200; see also Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432 
(noting that an implication of regional exhaustion is the ability of right holders to 
ban parallel imports from outside the region). 
 99 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 8. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20. 
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port Product License issued by a national agency or the European 
Medicines Agency.
103
  Prior to placing the imported drug on the mar-
ket, the trader must demonstrate that the imported drug is identical 
to the drug currently available on the importing country’s market.
104
  
“Sufficiently similar” products—drugs “manufactured according to 
the same formulation, [use] the same active ingredients, and . . . have 
the same therapeutic effects”—are acceptable.
105
  The policies behind 
the EU parallel trade system aim to further the goal of improving the 
quality, safety, and efficacy of health care for EU citizens.
106
 
Parallel trade is attractive in Europe because the governments of 
EU member countries fix drug prices—drug prices are not controlled 
by free competition laws, as they are in the United States.
107
  EU coun-
tries with socialized medicine favor parallel trade as a way to obtain 
cheaper drugs and reduce government health-care spending.
108
  Eu-
ropean case law reflects this preference, as cases starting from the 
1970s onward have upheld the concept of regional exhaustion and 
have given priority to free trade throughout Europe.
109
  Notably, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a pharmaceutical company 
 
 103 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10.  In accordance with the concept of the free 
movement of goods, the European Medicines Agency has recently made parallel 
trade of pharmaceutical drugs in the EU easier by permitting a drug to go through a 
single registration process for safety, efficacy, and labeling review.  Lana Kraus, Note, 
Medication Misadventures: The Interaction of International Reference Pricing and Parallel 
Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527, 545 (2004).  Once 
approved, the drug may be placed on the market in all European countries with 
standardized labeling and dosage.  Id. at 545. 
 104 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 8. 
 105 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20. 
 106 Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, supra note 93, 
at 1–2. 
 107 EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 108 Julia A. Moore, Parallel Trade, Unparallel Laws: An Examination of the Pharmaceut-
ical Parallel Trade Law of the United States, the European Union and the World Trade Organ-
ization, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 77, 83 (2006); cf. Kanavos & Vandoros, supra note 
74, at 336 (finding that parallel trade does not lead to price competition and charac-
terizing the effect of parallel trade on the pharmaceutical budgets of European 
countries as “at best ambiguous”). 
 109 See Case 15/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 2 
C.M.L.R. 480 (1974).  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Centrafarm gave priori-
ty to free trade by holding that once a patent holder places a product on the market 
or consents to placing the product on the market, then his intellectual property 
rights are exhausted and such rights cannot prevent parallel imports.  Id. at 503–04; 
see also Case 104/75, Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613, 2 C.M.L.R. 
271 (1976).  In De Peijper, the ECJ held that consumers can import cheaper drugs 
from a pharmacy in another member country if the drug was for sale in the consum-
er’s own country and interpreted Articles 30 to 36 (now Article 28 and 30) of the 
EEC Treaty as establishing the legality of parallel imports.  2 C.M.L.R. at 303–06. 
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exhausted its patent rights even if the company placed its product on 
the market in a country that did not offer patent protection for 
pharmaceutical drugs, as long as the company consented to placing 
its drug on that market.
110
  In an unusual move in 2004, however, the 
ECJ in Bundesverband der Arneimittel-Importeure eV v. Bayer AG reversed 
the European Commission’s decision that Bayer violated Article 81 of 
the EEC Treaty when Bayer penalized wholesalers in Spain and 
France with excise duties for exporting a drug to the United King-
dom, where it was forty percent more expensive.
111
  Article 81 prohi-
bits agreements that attempt to restrict the common European mar-
ket.
112
  But in Bayer, the ECJ held that Bayer could independently 
restrict parallel trade of its products.
113
  Despite this holding, which 
appears to curb parallel trade, the European Commission has distin-
guished Bayer as concerning “competition issues (private sector prac-
tices regarding supplies) and does not alter the [ECJ’s] case law on 
free movement of goods or state measures regarding parallel im-
ports.”
114
  The relatively consistent commitment to the free movement 
 
 110 Case 187/80, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar B.V., 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 3 C.M.L.R. 
463 (1981).  Merck sold its drug in Italy, where, at the time, there were no patent 
protections for pharmaceutical drugs and prices were low.  Id. at 467–68.  Stephar 
imported the drug from Italy into the Netherlands.  Id.  The ECJ held that since 
Merck consented to putting its drug on the Italian market, it exhausted its patent 
rights, despite the absence of Italian patent protection.  Id. at 471–72; see also Case C-
267/95, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-6285, 1 C.M.L.R. 83 
(1997).  The ECJ in Primecrown affirmed the principles in Stephar—namely, that the 
patentee consented to market the product in Spain and Portugal (where there were 
no pharmaceutical patent rights at the time) and, therefore, its rights were ex-
hausted and traders could import the products into the United Kingdom.  1 
C.M.L.R. at 172–74, 176; cf. Case 19/84, Pharmon B.V. v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 
2281, 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985).  In Pharmon, the issue was whether the ECJ should ap-
ply the exhaustion principle to drugs sold under a compulsory license.  3 C.M.L.R. at 
781; see infra Part III.C (defining compulsory licensing).  According to the ECJ, the 
patent rights were not exhausted because the patentee did not consent to the com-
pulsory license.  3 C.M.L.R. at 791.   
 111 Case C-2/01, 2004 E.C.R. I-23. 4 C.M.L.R. 692, 698 (2004).  Article 81 was pre-
viously Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.  4 C.M.L.R. at 693. 
 112 EEC Treaty, supra note 36, art. 81. 
 113 Bayer, 4 C.M.L.R. at 713–14 (“The mere fact that the unilateral policy of quotas 
implemented by Bayer . . . produces the same effect as an export ban does not mean 
either that the manufacturer imposed such a ban or that there was an agreement 
prohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treaty.”); id. at 718 (“[T]he mere fact that there is a 
hindrance to parallel imports is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an 
agreement prohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treaty.”). 
 114 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20.  For an argument that the Bayer 
decision weakens the EU’s economic solidarity and cohesiveness and that because 
the EU favors parallel trade, authorities will continue to encourage parallel trade, see 
generally Luke W. Reynolds, Note & Comment, ECJ in Bayer Allows Pharmaceutical 
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of goods by the ECJ likely correlates to the enduring EU parallel 
trade system.
115
 
Empirical data shows that parallel imports account for a signifi-
cant portion of the pharmaceutical markets in EU countries.  Den-
mark and Sweden lead the way, with parallel imports making up 
15.2% and 13.9%, respectively, of their pharmaceutical markets in 
2007.
116
  In Germany, the market share of re-imported drugs was 5.8% 
in 2002
117
 and it reached 8.9% in 2007.
118
  The increase is likely be-
cause of the continued effect of a 2001 German law that makes it 
mandatory for pharmacists to supply low-priced alternative drugs, 
namely, generics or parallel imports, when possible.
119
  An estimated 
90% of pharmacists supply parallel imports in the United Kingdom.
120
  
In 2007, parallel imports made up 12.4% of the United Kingdom 
market.
121
  Parallel trade in the EU is expected to gradually increase 
as a result of the enlargement of the EU in 2004.
122
 
 
Companies to Increase Profits by Breaking Down European Union Cohesion—With Just One 
Pill, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379 (2006).  
 115 As evidence of its continued commitment to promoting single EU market, the 
ECJ recently reiterated that agreements between producers and distributors defined 
in terms of national divisions in trade between member states may violate the EEC 
Treaty’s goal of achieving a single market.  Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-
515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission, 2009 
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1330, ¶ 61 (3d Chamber Oct. 6, 2009).  Evidence that consum-
ers have been deprived of the benefits of effective competition in terms of supply or 
price is not required to find that an agreement is anti-competitive, as Article 81 of 
the treaty protects the overall structure of the market and not just the interests of 
competitors or consumers.  Id. at ¶ 63.  As such, an agreement between a drug man-
ufacturer and Spanish wholesalers that distinguished between prices charged for 
domestic retail and prices charged for drug exports to other EU countries violated 
Article 81.  Id. at ¶¶ 7, 66–67. 
 116 EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 
FIGURES, KEY DATA, 2009 UPDATE 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.interfarma.org.br/site2/images/Site%20Interfarma/Informacoesdoseto
r/Publicacoes/EFPIA2009.pdf [hereinafter EFPIA]. 
 117 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 11–12. 
 118 EFPIA, supra note 116, at 3. 
 119 ARFWEDSON, supra note 42, at 11. 
 120 Id. at 13. 
 121 EFPIA, supra note 116, at 3. 
 122 EURACTIV, supra note 25.  For example, Romania, which ascended to the EU in 
2007, has become a “hotspot” for exporting drugs to other EU countries via parallel 
trade.  Parallel Trade Continues to Drive Pharma Exports, BUS. MONITOR ONLINE (May 11, 
2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/pharmaceuticals-biotechnology/ 
pharmaceuticals-industry/14431230-1.html.  Applications to the European Medicines 
Agency for parallel trade licenses for drugs originating in Romania jumped from 11 
in 2007 to 191 in 2009.  Id.  Membership in the EU is largely attributed as the driving 
force behind Romania’s growing pharmaceutical export industry, as “improved trade 
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Despite the establishment of parallel trade in the EU and its 
continued growth, criticisms of the system persist and mirror the 
general concerns of parallel trade described above.
123
  Opposing pa-
rallel trade, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry al-
leges that it caused a £1.3 billion loss in sales revenue for the United 
Kingdom–based pharmaceutical industry in 2005.
124
  The European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations agrees that 
the desire to create a single market for pharmaceuticals is contribut-
ing to significant losses for the research-driven pharmaceutical indus-
try and believes that importers, not patients, are receiving benefits to 
the detriment of the intellectual property system.
125
  Additionally, crit-
ics question whether parallel trade has really promoted a single mar-
ket because differences between European national markets still ex-
ist.
126
  Instead of facilitating a common market, parallel trade may 
highlight competing goals of the EU—namely, the ability of each 
member country to set its own drug prices versus the principle of free 
trade that allows traders to profit at the expense of pharmaceutical 
companies.
127
  In addition, pharmaceutical companies may be res-
ponding to reduced profits by setting a uniform price that is higher 
than most consumers are willing to pay.  For example, in 2003, Roche 
announced that it was setting a European drug price of fifty-two euros 
per day for its new AIDS drug, an amount higher than other AIDS 
drugs, which may symbolize an attempt to stop parallel trade from 
inhibiting research cost recovery.
128
  Finally, the complexities of the 
European supply chain may create opportunities for counterfeit 
 
conditions inherent in EU membership meant there was greater potential for sales of 
Romanian products abroad.”  Id.  
 123 See supra Part II.C (describing the arguments against parallel trade). 
 124 EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 125 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10; EURACTIV, supra note 25; see also Danzon, su-
pra note 89, at 303–04 (“[I]f the free movement of goods is defined to permit paral-
lel trade, this undermines the ability of pharmaceutical companies to maintain price 
differentials between countries.  This reduces revenues which in turn has adverse 
long run effects on the level of R&D, particularly R&D investments in the EU . . . .”).  
 126 Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, supra note 93, 
at 3 (“The continued differences between European markets lead to excess costs 
(such as higher marketing costs, higher distribution and administrative costs) and, in 
some cases, to excess production capacity, that could be off-set by a better operating 
(single) market.”).  But cf. Moore, supra note 108, at 82 (“In the EU, the drive to-
wards the single market outweighs the negative effects of parallel trade within the 
Community.”). 
 127 Costa-Font & Burakoff, supra note 75, at 107. 
 128 Kraus, supra note 103, at 550. 
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pharmaceutical drugs to enter into the market,
129
 another common 
argument offered by those who oppose parallel trade. 
Supporters of the EU parallel trade system do exist.  For exam-
ple, the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies 
notes reduced consumer spending as a result of parallel trade and al-
so points to the benefits of competition and free movement of medi-
cines.
130
  This association also questions whether parallel imports real-
ly hurt drug companies’ sales volume, given that parallel imports are 
still the original products produced by the industry.
131
  Such support, 
coupled with the priority given to parallel trade by EU entities like 
the European Commission and the ECJ, suggests that the EU parallel 
trade system will continue to grow.  Countries looking to adopt paral-
lel trade would be well served by reviewing the EU’s experience in es-
tablishing and maintaining parallel trade on a regional basis. 
III. THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS AND THE DESIRE FOR A SINGLE 
MARKET: A DISCUSSION OF PARALLEL TRADE IN THE AFRICAN UNION 
The urgency of the public health crisis in the AU demands a 
thorough evaluation of the roles of intellectual property law and eco-
nomics in addressing the crisis.  Understanding the magnitude of the 
drug problem in the AU and the current state of African intellectual 
property regimes will provide a foundation from which to develop 
and refine solutions to improve access to affordable drugs.  Impor-
tantly, the long-term vision of the AU—namely, to create a single 
African market
132
—must be considered in order to ensure that any so-
lutions proffered accord with the goals and functions of the AU go-
verning entities.  Finally, a review of previous attempts to address the 
African public health crisis by international bodies, African countries, 
and other organizations highlights the ongoing search to find the op-
timal balance between intellectual property rights, market forces, and 
health care.  Notably, parallel trade has been considered a means of 
increasing the availability of affordable drugs and has been adopted 
in South Africa.  Parallel trade is relevant because the public health 
crisis in the AU creates strong motives to incorporate intellectual 
 
 129 See Liang, supra note 88, at 854–56.  Drugs may change hands more than twen-
ty times before reaching their final destination.  Id.  A drug is manufactured in one 
country, shipped to the country with the intended market, sold by wholesalers in that 
country, and then moved to a more expensive market.  Id.  The World Health Organ-
ization (WHO) estimates that counterfeit drugs comprise eight to ten percent of the 
European pharmaceutical market.  Id. 
 130 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10; EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 131 EURACTIV, supra note 25. 
 132 See infra Part III.B (describing the AU’s goal of a common market).  
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property rights with the AU’s goal of a common market in order to 
increase access to drugs. 
A. Persistent Limited Access to HIV/AIDS Medication in Africa 
Despite Limited Patent Protection 
The HIV/AIDS crisis and lack of affordable antiretroviral treat-
ments in Africa is well documented.  Sub-Saharan Africa continues to 
be the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic.
133
  More than two out of three 
adults and nearly 90% of children living in the region are infected 
with HIV, resulting in a total of 22.5 million people living with HIV in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
134
  Almost three out of four AIDS deaths globally 
occurred in the region in 2007.
135
  Approximately 17% of people in 
sub-Saharan Africa received HIV/AIDS medications in 2005.
136
  South 
Africans account for 25% of those receiving antiretroviral treat-
ment.
137
  Countries like Botswana and Uganda have drug coverage of 
up to 50%, while the percentage of people receiving medication in 
other African countries remains below 10%.
138
  Although the price of 
first line HIV/AIDS treatment has dropped, the price of second-line 
treatments remains very high, with significant price differences be-
tween African countries.
139
 
Although the devastating effects of the drug crisis in Africa on 
HIV/AIDS patients are obvious, the exact reason why essential drugs 
are so inaccessible is not as readily evident.  Patents, however, are not 
the main barrier preventing access to HIV/AIDS treatment in Africa.  
Although drugs may be patented in Africa under national patent law 
or through regional intellectual property groups, many antiretroviral 
drugs are not patented in Africa.
140
  Despite this fact, the price for the 
drugs remains “unacceptably high” in some countries,
141
 which wea-
kens the argument that patents are the reason for lack of access to 
 
 133 JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS &WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 4 (Dec. 2007), available at http://data.unaids.org/ 
pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_epiupdate_en.pdf. 
 134 Id. at 7. 
 135 Id. 
 136 WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRESS ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO HIV ANTIRETROVIRAL 
THERAPY: A REPORT ON “3 BY 5” AND BEYOND 7 (March 2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/fullreport_en_highres.pdf. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 29–30. 
 140 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain 
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa? 286 JAMA 1886, 1889 (2001).  
 141 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 136, at 29. 
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drugs.  Other factors besides the exclusive rights granted by patents 
are likely responsible, such as the high cost of treatments, poverty, 
national regulatory requirements for medicines, tariffs and sales tax, 
and insufficient international aid.
142
  Furthermore, whether patent 
protection in Africa is truly an incentive for pharmaceutical compa-
nies to develop and provide drugs for African consumers is debata-
ble.
143
  Given the variety of factors suggested as contributors to the 
drug crisis, a deeper look at the current market situation and intellec-
tual property law in the AU is worthwhile. 
B. Intellectual Property in the African Union Reflects the Goal of a 
Single Market 
Unlike the EU, with its established parallel trade system, coun-
tries that make up the AU are still in the infant stages of working to-
wards a single market.
144
  But recent activities within the AU reflect 
the goal of building a common market.  In 2002, to promote peace, 
security, and stability, the AU succeeded the Organization for African 
Unity.
145
  The AU Constitution incorporates the Treaty Establishing 
the African Economic Community (Treaty of Abuja) which envisions 
a common African market.
146
  The Treaty of Abuja calls for the crea-
tion and expansion of regional economic communities (RECs) to 
promote and strengthen trade between groups of African countries, 
with the goal of integrating the RECs into a single market based on 
free trade by 2023.
147
  The AU Commission functions as the day-to-day 
manager of the AU and “elaborates, promotes, coordinates and har-
 
 142 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1886, 1890–91. 
 143 Id. at 1890 (“[I]t is doubtful that pharmaceutical research and development 
will always require the incentive of patentability in poor countries, since the option 
to patent antiretroviral drugs in African has frequently gone unexercised.”); see also 
Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 554 (“[N]o matter what level of patent protection is af-
forded in developing countries, it is unlikely that developed country manufacturers 
will devote significant R&D resources to such [essential medicine] vaccines or treat-
ments.”). 
 144 The AU consists of fifty-three member states; the only African state not in the 
AU is Morocco.  Member States, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.africa-union.org/ 
root/au/memberstates/map.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 145 African Union in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 146 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community art. 6, June 3, 1991, 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/ 
AEC_Treaty_1991.pdf  [hereinafter Treaty of Abuja]. 
 147 Id.  Examples of RECs include the East African Community and the Economic 
Community of West African States.  EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, http://www.eac.int/ 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010); ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 
http://www.ecowas.int/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
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monizes the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the 
RECs.”
148
  Unlike the European Commission, which has the power to 
draft new laws and implement the policies of the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council,
149
 the AU Commission has no pow-
ers of its own.
150
  Challenges to African integration and achievement 
of a common market include lack of financial resources and political 
will, poor infrastructure, and inadequate trade facilitation.
151
  But in 
spite of these challenges, it is important to recognize the AU’s desire 
for a single market and to view intellectual property law in the AU 
within that framework. 
Most African countries have established patent regimes.  For ex-
ample, the earliest patent acts date in Rwanda to 1963, Liberia to 
1972, Senegal to 1977, Democratic Republic of the Congo to 1982, 
and Ethiopia to 1995.
152
  Additionally, regional-based intellectual 
property associations in Africa that are independent of the RECs aim 
to unify intellectual property regimes within Africa.
153
  These associa-
tions are notable because they show a relative willingness by African 
 
 148 Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 20, July 11, 2000, available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm; African 
Union in a Nutshell, supra note 145. 
 149 EEC Treaty, supra note 36, art. 211 (“The Commission shall . . . have its own 
power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken by the Council 
and by the European Parliament in the manner provided for in this Treaty”); The Eu-
ropean Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/ 
comm/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
[The European Commission] drafts proposals for new European laws, 
which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council.  It is al-
so the EU’s executive arm—in other words, it is responsible for imple-
menting the decisions of Parliament and the Council.  That means 
managing the day-to-day business of the European Union: implement-
ing its policies, running its programmes and spending its funds. 
Id. 
 150 Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 148, art. 20(3) (“The struc-
ture, functions and regulations of the Commission shall be determined by the As-
sembly.”); Keith Gottschalk & Siegmar Schmidt, The African Union and the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States? 4 INTERNATIONALE 
POLITIK UND GESELLSCHAFT [INT’L POL. & SOC’Y] 138, 141 (2004). 
 151 See Gottschalk & Schmidt, supra note 150, at 142; Dejo Olowu, Regional Integra-
tion, Development, and the African Union Agenda: Challenges, Gaps, and Opportunities, 13 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 235–43 (2003). 
 152 Least Developed Countries—Country Profiles, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/ldcs/en/country (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 153 See Africa Bureau—Cooperation and Partners, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/africa/en/partners_org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  The two 
main regional intellectual property organizations in Africa are the African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organization and the African Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion.  Id. 
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countries to cooperate on a regional basis when it comes to trade-
related issues. 
Created in 1977, the African Intellectual Property Organization 
(OAPI) covers Francophone Africa and is regulated by the Revised 
Bangui Agreement.
154
  The goals of the OAPI are to implement a 
common procedure for granting intellectual property rights, to pro-
mote economic development by effective protection of such rights, 
and to encourage creativity and technology transfer.
155
  The Revised 
Bangui Agreement serves as the national patent law for all OAPI 
member countries.
156
  The World Health Organization and Doctors 
Without Borders voiced concern over the Revised Bangui Agree-
ment.
157
  The organizations criticized the accord because it imposes 
strict conditions on the use of compulsory licenses and does not ex-
plicitly allow parallel imports from non-OAPI member countries.
158
  
The agreement, characterized as “TRIPS Plus,” takes a stricter ap-
proach than the basic intellectual property protection requirements 
set out in the TRIPS Agreement.
159
 
 
 154 See Revised Bangui Agreement tit. 1, § 1, art. 2, Feb. 24, 1999, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details.jsp?group_id=21&treaty_id=
227 (select “Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the 
Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization”); African Intellectual Proper-
ty Organization, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/africa/ 
en/partners_org/partners/oapi_bg.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 155 Revised Bangui Agreement, supra note 154, tit. 1, § 1, art. 2. 
 156 INT’L INTELL. PROP. INST., PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS 
PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 39–41 (2000), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/iipi_hiv.pdf; see Enyinna S. Nwauche, 
A Development Oriented Intellectual Property Regime for Africa at Part V.I(a) 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at 11th General Assembly of the Coun-
cil for the Development of Social Science Research for Africa, 2005), available at 
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/nwauche.pdf  (“[T]he OAPI states are closely 
integrated and could be considered a common intellectual property market.”). 
 157 See Press Release, Médecins San Frontières, New Agreement on Patents for 
Medicines in Francophone Africa Threatens Health of Populations (May 11, 2000), 
available at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=597&cat=press-
release. 
 158 COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 161 (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm; World 
Health Org., Fears Over New Regional Patent Agreement, ESSENTIAL DRUGS MONITOR, No. 
28/29, at 35 (2000), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/ 
pdf/s2248e/s2248e.pdf; Press Release, Médecins San Frontières, supra note 157; see 
infra Part III.C (defining compulsory licensing). 
 159 See Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public 
Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363, 385–86 
(2004). 
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Established in 1976 by the Agreement on the Creation of the 
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization, the African Re-
gional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) covers English-
speaking Africa.
160
  The sixteen member countries include Kenya, 
Ghana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
161
  The goals of the ARIPO include 
harmonizing and developing intellectual property laws, promoting 
the exchange of ideas, and providing training.
162
  Unlike the OAPI, 
which provides substantive national patent law for its members 
through the Revised Bangui Agreement, the ARIPO’s activities are 
largely procedural.  For example, under the Harare Protocol on Pa-
tents and Industrial Designs, the ARIPO has the power to grant pa-
tents on behalf of member countries.
163
  But the laws of each ARIPO 
member country determine the substantive rights stemming from the 
patent.
164
  Therefore, the ARIPO serves mainly as a facilitative body 
that enables faster registration for intellectual property rights.
165
 
Information about African intellectual property law is difficult to 
obtain for several reasons.  Most African countries have a small intel-
lectual property law profession, communication is difficult, and intel-
lectual property is often seen as an imported commodity that is unaf-
fordable, as in the case of patented drugs.
166
  Some countries, like 
South Africa and Nigeria, have stronger intellectual property regimes 
than others.
167
  Finally, the OAPI and the ARIPO are underutilized 
because of lack of confidence in patent protection or general indiffe-
rence.
168
  But national patent laws and the OAPI and the ARIPO are 
 
 160 Agreement on the Creation of the African Regional Intellectual Property Or-
ganization art. 1, Nov. 13, 2004, available at http://www.aripo.org (select “Down-
loads”; then choose “Laws & Protocols”; then view “The Lusaka Agreement on the 
Creation of the Organization”). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. art. 3. 
 163 Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs Within the Framework of the Afri-
can Regional Intellectual Property Organization § 1, Feb. 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.aripo.org (select “Downloads”; then choose “Laws & Protocols”; then 
view “The Harare Protocol on Patents, Utility Models, and Designs”). 
 164 Id. § 3(11) (“Provided it is maintained, a patent granted by the Office shall in 
each designated State have the same effect as a patent registered, granted or other-
wise having effect under the applicable national law.”); Nwauche, supra note 156, at 
Part V.I(b). 
 165 Nwauche, supra note 156, at Part V.I(b). 
 166 Jeremy Phillips, Intellectual Property and Africa: The Agony and Entropy, 3 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. & PRAC. 205, 205 (2008). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id.  See Nwauche, supra note 156, at Part V.I(c), for an argument of the need 
for one intellectual property organization in Africa to promote the AU’s goal of 
creating a common African market. 
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not the only sources of intellectual property within the AU.  Interna-
tional bodies have attempted to shape intellectual property in devel-
oping countries and have consequently impacted AU countries, par-
ticularly in the context of public health. 
C. The Compulsory Licensing Option Under the TRIPS Agreement and 
the Doha Declaration: A Potential Means of Addressing the Drug 
Crisis, but Not a Cure-All 
Although the TRIPS Agreement is silent on parallel trade and 
leaves the selection of an exhaustion doctrine up to each WTO 
member country, the agreement offers compulsory licensing as 
another way for developing countries to obtain patented drugs.  Ar-
ticle 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for the use of patented sub-
ject matter by a government or authorized third party without the 
permission of the patent right holder if certain requirements are 
met.
169
  When a government grants a compulsory license, the patentee 
can no longer exclude others from using the claimed patented sub-
ject matter.
170
  In the context of patented drugs, a compulsory license 
means a government can produce and sell a patented drug without 
the authorization of the pharmaceutical company.
171
 
Although the WTO introduced compulsory licensing as another 
way of increasing access to patented goods, member countries recog-
nized several limitations of the compulsory-license provision as pro-
vided in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
172
  First, Article 31(b) 
says that a country seeking to use the compulsory-license mechanism 
should obtain consent from the patent holder to use the patented 
product, but countries can waive this requirement in national emer-
gencies.
173
  The Doha Declaration expanded the scope of Article 
31(b) by broadly defining the phrase “national emergency.”
174
  Para-
 
 169 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31.  Under Article 31(b), governments or 
authorized third parties seeking a compulsory license should make an effort to first 
obtain consent from the patent right holder.  Id. art. 31(b).  Governments or autho-
rized third parties may waive this requirement during a national emergency.  Id.  Ac-
cording to Article 31(f), governments or authorized third parties can only grant a 
compulsory license for domestic use.  Id. art. 31(f).  As stated in Article 31(g), the 
license is terminated when the circumstances that led to the compulsory license no 
longer exist.  Id. art. 31(g).  Under Article 31(h), the entity granting the compulsory 
license should pay the patent holder remuneration to compensate for suspension of 
his patent rights.  Id. art. 31(h). 
 170 Harrelson, supra note 81, at 176. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 511–12. 
 173 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31(b). 
 174 See Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 5(c). 
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graph 5(c) of the declaration states that “[e]ach Member has the 
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, ma-
laria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
175
  Second, the require-
ment in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement that a member country 
may only grant a compulsory license predominantly for domestic use 
is problematic for many developing countries because, even if they 
were to grant a compulsory license, they lack the manufacturing ca-
pability to produce pharmaceuticals domestically.
176
  A resolution 
passed on August 30, 2003 (the “August 30 Decision”) addresses this 
issue and includes a waiver for Article 31(f) that allows developed 
member countries to produce and export generic drugs to develop-
ing countries without manufacturing capabilities.
177
 
Despite the ability of developed countries to export generic 
drugs to developing countries, only one developed country has 
granted a compulsory license for this purpose so far.
178
  In October 
2007, Canada granted a compulsory license permitting a Canadian 
pharmaceutical company to manufacture and export generic AIDS 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31(f).  Paragraph 6 of the Doha Dec-
laration recognizes that because of the domestic use limitation in article 31(f) of 
TRIPS, “WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”  Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 6; see 
also Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 512 (“The Doha Ministerial also acknowledged that 
the ‘domestic use’ limitation on compulsory licensing would limit the value of [the 
national emergency exception] for many developing countries and LDCs [(least-
developed countries)] that do not have sufficient domestic manufacturing capaci-
ty.”).  In regards to the Article 6 problem of the Doha Declaration, developing coun-
tries argued that the broad language of TRIPS meant that member countries could 
grant compulsory licenses “for foreign suppliers to provide medicines in the domes-
tic market” and that members could “grant compulsory licenses to supply foreign 
markets.”  Skyes, supra note 85, at 54–55 (citing Developing Countries Push for TRIPS to 
Allow Cheaper Medicines, 19 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 7 (June 22, 2001)). 
 177 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004) (decision of Aug. 
30, 2003).  The August 30 Decision requires certification that the importing country 
lacks domestic manufacturing capabilities, distinct labeling and packaging require-
ments, and limits remuneration only the exporting country.  Id.; Opderbeck, supra 
note 85, at 514; Alexandra G. Watson, Note, International Intellectual Property Rights: Do 
TRIPS’ Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in Developing 
Countries? 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 146–47 (2009). 
 178 Watson, supra note 177, at 147. 
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drugs to Rwanda.
179
  The lackluster response to compulsory licensing 
may stem from fears that developed countries will exert undue influ-
ence over developing countries that accept the exports.
180
  Many de-
veloping countries fear sanctions and business repercussions as a re-
sult of issuing compulsory licenses.
181
  Consequently, compulsory 
licensing could be a valuable tool, but as evidenced by the controver-
sies surrounding the WTO decisions and the lack of usage, compul-
sory licensing is not the cure-all to the problem of affordable drugs. 
D. South Africa’s Controversial Enactment of Parallel Trade and EU-
Style Regulation 
South Africa is a microcosm of the public health crisis in the AU 
and also a forerunner in addressing the drug problem.  In 2007, ap-
proximately 5.7 million adults and children were living with 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa.
182
  Although the country has not consis-
tently addressed health-care inequities stemming from the AIDS epi-
demic,
183
 South Africa took a significant step to address the lack of af-
fordable medications in 1997.  The South African government passed 
the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 
which explicitly authorizes parallel imports and compulsory licensing 
to promote access to affordable drugs.
184
  South Africa enacted the 
 
 179 Id.; Canada Issues Compulsory License for HIV/AIDS Drug Export to Rwanda, in First 
Test of WTO Procedure, 11 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 4 (2007), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly11-32.pdf. 
 180 Watson, supra note 177, at 147. 
 181 Id. at 158–59. 
 182 WORLD HEALTH ORG., EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FACT SHEET ON HIV AND AIDS SOUTH 
AFRICA 4 (Sept. 2008), available at http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/ 
predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008_ZA.pdf. 
 183 Hoosen Coovadia et al., The Health and Health System of South Africa: Historical 
Roots of Current Public Health Challenges, 374 LANCET 817, 824 (2009). 
 184 Section 10 of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 
90 of 1997 called for the addition of Section 15C to the Medicines and Related Sub-
stances Control Act of 1965 and reads as follows: 
The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act [Medi-
cines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965] after section 15B: 
“Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines 15C.  The 
Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the 
public and in particular may—(a) notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in the Patents Act 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978) de-
termine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent 
granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such med-
icine which has been put onto the market by the owner of the medi-
cine or with his or her consent; (b) prescribe the conditions on which 
any medicine which is identical in composition, meets the same quality 
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doctrine of international exhaustion by permitting the importation of 
a patented medicine into the country that the patent holder first 
placed on sale outside of South Africa.
185
 
South Africa set guidelines for the introduction of parallel im-
ports into the market that resemble the parallel-import requirements 
under the regional exhaustion system in the EU.
186
  The guidelines 
require prior registration of the patented medicine in South Africa 
and a trader must receive a permit from the Ministry of Health.
187
  Af-
ter receiving an importing permit, the trader must register the drug 
that it plans to import and provide information about the exporter 
and the labeler.
188
  The guidelines also require repackaging of the 
drug using the name approved in South Africa and placement of the 
words “Parallel Imported Medicine” on the label.
189
  The largest ex-
porter of these drugs to South Africa is India,
190
 which illustrates the 
global impact of parallel trade. 
 
standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as that of 
another medicine already registered in the Republic but which is im-
ported by a person other than the person who is the holder of the reg-
istration certificate of the medicine already registered and which origi-
nates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as 
approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be imported; 
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for as well as the use of the 
medicine referred to in paragraph (b). 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, supra note 
35, § 10; see also Bart, supra note 20, at 998 (describing the enactment of the Medi-
cines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which legalized parallel im-
ports of expensive AIDS drugs); Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access 
to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Exam-
ple, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2001) (summarizing the implementation 
of and reaction to South Africa’s legalization of parallel imports). 
 185 Draft Regulations in Terms of Act 101 of 1965, as amended (2000) (S. Afr.), 
available at  
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/regulations/2001/101draftregulations.pdf  (“A medi-
cine under patent in the Republic may be imported into and disposed of in the Re-
public if such medicine has been put onto the market outside the Republic by or 
with the consent of the patent holder of the medicine in the Republic subject to the 
provisions of the Act and these Regulations.”); see also YOLANDA TAYLER, BATTLING 
HIV/AIDS: A DECISION MAKER’S GUIDE TO THE PROCUREMENT OF MEDICINES AND 
RELATED SUPPLIES 117 (World Bank Publications 2004) (summarizing the guidelines 
for parallel imports in South Africa under the rule of international exhaustion). 
 186 See supra Part II.D (describing the parallel trade process in the EU). 
 187 Guideline for Parallel Importation of Medicines in South Africa in GG25145 of 
27 June 2003 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/notices/ 
2003/25145/25145h.pdf. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit 
on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 814 (2001). 
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South Africa’s implementation of international exhaustion was 
not without controversy.  Questioning the constitutionality of the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, thirty-
nine pharmaceutical companies sued the South African govern-
ment.
191
  The United States also became involved in efforts to reverse 
the law.
192
  But in the face of public pressure, the pharmaceutical 
companies dropped the lawsuit.
193
  South Africa is an example of an 
African country that saw parallel trade as a viable means of increasing 
access to affordable drugs and took the broadest approach possible—
international exhaustion. 
E. Other Proposals for Solving Africa’s Drug Crisis: Attempts to Limit 
Parallel Trade 
In an attempt to solve the problem of affordable drugs, existing 
proposals offered by outside organizations have addressed the role of 
parallel trade.  Many of these proposals look primarily to the relation-
ship between developed and developing countries and, as a result, 
view parallel trade as a harmful trade mechanism.  Such proposals 
advocate limiting parallel trade with an eye towards promoting the 
pharmaceutical industry or licensing purchase rights on an interna-
tional level.  But a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion 
has not been completely overlooked, which illustrates the need to 
further consider the feasibility of such a system. 
The goal of the Developing Economies’ Fund for Essential New 
Drugs (DEFEND) Proposal is to establish “a new international organ-
ization to purchase the license rights for designated areas and distri-
bute the drugs at low cost with a required co-payment from local gov-
ernments.  Furthermore, governments would restrict parallel trade to 
support desirable price discrimination.”
194
  Supporters of the 
DEFEND Proposal advocate separating the cost of giving consumers 
access to drugs from incentives for pharmaceutical companies to im-
prove and research drugs.
195
  Supporters also look towards increased 
assistance from developed countries as a major source of funding for 
the project.
196
 
The International Intellectual Property Institute’s (IIPI) plan in-
cludes dividing national markets by ability to pay for pharmaceuticals, 
 
 191 Bart, supra note 20, at 998. 
 192 Dolmo, supra note 184, at 138. 
 193 Bart, supra note 20, at 998; Dolmo, supra note 184, at 138. 
 194 ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 22. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
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adopting prices for pharmaceuticals based on ability to pay, and im-
plementing a system of international subsidies to help poorer coun-
tries afford drugs.
197
  The IIPI’s plan focuses on global adoption of na-
tional exhaustion of IP rights.
198
  According to the IIPI’s proposal, 
rejecting international exhaustion protects pharmaceutical compa-
nies from the effects of parallel importing.
199
  Developing countries, 
however, have not been supportive of national exhaustion,
200
 likely 
because it shuts out access to parallel imports.  The balance between 
the competing interests of developing countries and pharmaceutical 
companies is a difficult one to strike because so many variables are 
present.
201
 
Both the DEFEND Proposal and the plan advocated by the IIPI 
aim to restrict parallel imports.  But one scholar, Professor Keith 
Maskus, notes that regional exhaustion regimes among poor coun-
tries may be a viable option to improve access to drugs.
202
  Professor 
Maskus suggests that the adoption of regional exhaustion by poorer 
countries would increase the size of the market in which prices are 
integrated, would allow low-income nations to avoid high prices for 
low-volume products, and would reduce transportation costs typically 
incurred with parallel trade on an international level.
203
  The expecta-
tion would fall on regional groups consisting of low-income countries 
to ban parallel exports to high-income economies in order to keep 
supply available locally and not undermine pricing in countries out-
side the region.
204
 
By outlining the potential benefits of a regional exhaustion sys-
tem in developing countries and pointing to the need for self-
imposed limits of such a system, Professor Maskus’s proposal shows 
the value of considering all sides of parallel trade.  Instead of looking 
 
 197 Harrelson, supra note 81, at 197–98. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 103, at 552 (“The ideal solution would integrate 
three objectives: (1) allow for the promotion of pharmaceutical R&D, (2) create in-
centives for pharmaceutical companies to provide essential medicines to underdeve-
loped countries at an affordable cost (encourage differential pricing), and (3) pro-
mote principles of free trade.”). 
 202 KEITH E. MASKUS, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, FINAL REPORT TO THE WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 3 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf. 
 203 Id. at 43. 
 204 Id. 
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to shut out parallel trade, the growing prominence of this trade me-
chanism should be acknowledged.  This approach is critical in light 
of the AU’s desire for a common market and the establishment of pa-
rallel trade in South Africa to lower drug costs.  Regional exhaustion 
in the AU has the potential to serve as an effective means for increas-
ing access to affordable drugs while complementing the AU’s goal of 
a common market and addressing the evolving presence of parallel 
trade. 
IV. REGIONAL EXHAUSTION IN THE AFRICAN UNION: ANOTHER TOOL 
IN THE FIGHT FOR AFFORDABLE MEDICATIONS 
In light of the EU’s success with regional exhaustion and the ur-
gent need for medications, the AU should consider a regional paral-
lel trade system to supplement other measures, such as compulsory 
licensing, and increase the availability of affordable drugs.  The impe-
tus to adopt regional exhaustion is strong in the AU.  African coun-
tries have a basic need for essential medicines at an affordable cost 
that is aggravated by extreme price differences between AU coun-
tries.
205
  Recent activities by African countries demonstrate the will-
power necessary to obtain affordable drugs and improve cohesion 
across the continent.  For example, developing countries put up a 
strong fight with regard to expanding the scope of the compulsory 
licensing measures in the TRIPS Agreement to cover public health 
crises.
206
  Furthermore, regional intellectual property organizations 
reflect the AU’s goal of a common market.
207
  South Africa turned to 
parallel trade in an attempt to make pharmaceutical drugs more af-
fordable for its citizens and has reached out to countries like India to 
fulfill that goal.
208
  Instead of looking outward, a parallel trade system 
built on regional exhaustion should be considered a viable means of 
bringing affordable drugs to Africa. 
As with any proposal, both the intended and unintended conse-
quences must be considered.  To date, the parallel trade discussion 
has focused on the battle over pharmaceutical companies’ profits and 
patent protection while pitting developed countries against develop-
ing countries.  Despite continued debate over the exact impact of pa-
 
 205 See infra Part IV.A (explaining findings of significant variations in prices for 
similar drugs in AU countries). 
 206 See supra Part III.C (describing the evolution of the compulsory licensing 
measure in the TRIPS Agreement). 
 207 See supra Part III.B (noting the AU’s desire for a single market). 
 208 See supra Part III.D (summarizing South Africa’s experience with parallel 
trade). 
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rallel trade on the research-driven pharmaceutical industry and ques-
tions about consumer savings, parallel trade of drugs does not show 
signs of stopping and simply cannot be dismissed any longer.  Fur-
thermore, the impact of any proposed solution to the drug crisis, in-
cluding parallel trade, on the relationship between developed and 
developing countries should be acknowledged from the outset.  
Meaningful limits on regional parallel trade should be implemented 
to ensure that parallel imports reach the intended consumers in the 
AU and that developing AU countries do not have to fear repercus-
sions from developed countries.  By addressing potential conse-
quences, the benefits of a regional parallel trade system can be fully 
appreciated.  A parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion 
would provide the AU with another tool in the fight to bring afforda-
ble drugs to patients. 
A. Drug Price Differentials Between African Union Countries and the 
Desire for a Common Market as Motivators for the Adoption of 
Regional Exhaustion 
The choice of exhaustion doctrine is a sovereign decision and 
presents an opportunity to promote national or regional interests.
209
  
South Africa implemented international exhaustion in 1997, and the 
move caused immediate outcry from pharmaceutical companies and 
the United States.
210
  In light of the controversy over international ex-
haustion,
211
 adoption of an international exhaustion system across AU 
countries is unlikely to be politically feasible.  But other factors—
namely, price differentials between AU countries, the desire for a 
common market, and improved distribution—favor the enactment of 
a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion in the AU. 
First, the main driving factor for parallel trade is price differenc-
es between countries for similar products,
212
 and the AU meets this 
prong of the test.  Drug prices differ significantly between countries 
in the AU—not just between developed and developing countries 
globally.  The extreme range of drug prices in Africa is evident from a 
recent empirical study: retail prices for the drug ciprofloxacin, which 
treats bacterial infections, ranged from $197 to $740; for metformin, 
 
 209 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (explaining the WTO’s open 
stance on the principle of exhaustion). 
 210 See supra Part III.D (describing the controversy surrounding South Africa’s 
enactment of parallel trade). 
 211 See supra Part II.C (noting the arguments for and against adopting internation-
al exhaustion). 
 212 Bart, supra note 20, at 997. 
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a drug used for treatment of diabetes, prices ranged from $5 to $50.
213
  
The ratio of lowest to highest retail prices between African countries 
spread from 1:1.1 to 1:10.
214
  Notably, the ratio for drug prices be-
tween OCED countries, which includes several European countries 
that are key parallel importers, such as Denmark, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, ranged from only 1:1.6 to 1:3.6.
215
  A recent study 
noted that even though the public sector may provide medicines at a 
reduced cost, such medicines are not consistently available and pa-
tients must still buy drugs in the private sector where they are often 
unaffordable.
216
  For example, the mark-up of drug prices, which 
measures the difference between the manufacturer’s selling price 
and the final price charged to patients after add-on costs such as tax-
es, varied from 56% in Tanzania to 358% in Uganda in the private 
sector.
217
  Similarly, prices for the same drug differed by 124% be-
tween Ethiopia and Uganda.
218
  Compared to African countries, the 
price differences between drugs in European countries is relatively 
small, yet parallel trade is still viewed in the EU as an effective means 
of reducing drug costs.  The variation in prices is even greater be-
tween AU countries and the need to provide affordable drugs is even 
more urgent.  The main motivation for parallel trade via regional ex-
haustion—price differences between localized countries—is present 
between AU member states. 
Second, like the EU, the ultimate goal of the AU is to achieve a 
single African market based on free-trade principles.  The EU turned 
to regional exhaustion as a means of achieving a common market; 
regional exhaustion has the potential to facilitate a common market 
in the AU as well.  Importantly, the high degree of homogeneity 
among European member states is a large reason for the successful 
integration of the EU as a political and economic unit.
219
  Therefore, 
 
 213 K. Bala and Kiran Sagoo, Patents and Prices, HAI NEWS (Health Action Int’l, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Apr./May 2000, at tbl.7, available at 
http://www.haiweb.org/pubs/hainews/Patents%20and%20Prices.html. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Id. 
 216 A. Cameron et al., Medicine Prices, Availability, and Affordability in 36 Developing 
and Middle-Income Countries: A Secondary Analysis, 373 LANCET 240, 245 (2009).  The 
same study found that the availability of generic drugs, which are typically lower 
priced than branded drugs, varies widely within Africa, ranging from 14.8% availabil-
ity in Chad to 79.1% in Ethiopia.  Id. at 244. 
 217 Id. at 245. 
 218 MYHR, supra note 24, at tbl.9. 
 219 Yi Feng and Gaspare M. Genna, Regional Integration and Domestic Institutional 
Homogeneity: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Integration in the Americas, Pacific Asia 
and Western Europe, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 278, 298 (2003). 
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even in the face of the ECJ decision in Bayer that could have poten-
tially caused cracks in the European parallel trade system,
220
 cohesion 
and commitment to a common market remains strong in the EU. 
Likewise, to successfully implement a regional parallel trade sys-
tem in the AU, strong cohesion between AU member countries is re-
quired.  Under Article 73 of the Treaty of Abuja, members agree to 
promote and increase cooperation in the field of health as part of the 
goal of achieving a common economic market.
221
  Although the AU 
strives for a unified African continent, substantial political, cultural, 
and economic differences exist between countries.  But the activities 
of the African RECs offer hope for sustained regional economic co-
operation.  For example, the Economic Community of the West Afri-
can States, consisting of fifteen states, including Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Senegal, has taken steps to promote free trade in its area.
222
  This REC 
has prioritized health policy by creating the West African Health Or-
ganization to encourage health research, increase drug manufactur-
ing, and establish quality controls.
223
  The RECs would be a good 
place to initially implement regional exhaustion and parallel trade 
because they are already established and participating in shared eco-
nomic activities.  It will be easier to surmount any cultural or political 
differences when working with a group of countries that already inte-
ract on a regular basis and are committed to regional organization. 
Other reasons exist for selecting regional exhaustion and en-
couraging parallel trade between AU member states.  As noted by 
Professor Maskus, the exchange of drugs between African countries 
could reduce transportation costs,
224
 as compared to an exchange be-
tween, for example, South Africa and India.  Lower transportation 
costs further efficient regional distribution.  Additionally, if there are 
fewer steps in the supply chain, then there will be less of a chance for 
drug tampering or counterfeiting.
225
  Moreover, Africa is not yet in a 
position to be completely independent from foreign support.  There-
 
 220 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text (discussing the Bayer decision). 
 221 Treaty of Abuja, supra note 146, art. 73. 
 222 William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism, or Both: Health Policy and Regional Eco-
nomic Integration in Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime? 15 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 111, 163–65 (2006). 
 223 Id. 
 224 MASKUS, supra note 202, at 43. 
 225 See Chuka Odita, Nafdac’s Strategies For Winning, THIS DAY (Lagos, Nig.), Sept. 
17, 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200909180048.html  (explaining 
that in response to counterfeit drug imports from China and India, Nigeria’s Nation-
al Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is trying to 
find ways to increase drug regulation). 
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fore, a regional parallel trade system should supplement other meas-
ures, such as compulsory licensing, to provide affordable drugs.  If all 
AU countries were to adopt international exhaustion, they may alien-
ate pharmaceutical companies, as well as developed countries that 
provide foreign aid, because of the wide scope of international ex-
haustion.  But under regional exhaustion, the mere threat that a 
neighboring African country could import a drug may motivate 
pharmaceutical companies to reduce prices in the region.
226
  Regional 
exhaustion is a contained, efficient means of exchanging drugs at 
lower costs. 
Recent findings of significant differences between drug prices in 
AU countries reinforce the need to adopt a solution to the drug 
problem that accounts for market forces within the AU.  Price diffe-
rentials, coupled with the desire for a single market in the AU and 
increased distribution efficiency, mean that regional parallel trade 
has the potential to reduce drug costs while serving the interests of 
the AU.  Although regional exhaustion may be less controversial than 
international exhaustion, no solution to the African drug problem 
works in isolation.  As such, the impact of a regional-based parallel 
trade system in the AU on the pharmaceutical industry and the in-
volvement of developed countries must be further reviewed, keeping 
in mind the ultimate goal of reducing drug costs. 
B. Lower Drug Costs, Strong Regulation, and Robust Intellectual 
Property Regimes: Regional Parallel Trade Can Thrive in the 
African Union 
Adopting regional exhaustion in the AU would introduce both 
benefits and concerns, many of which would be unique to Africa.  
The potential benefits are evident—lower drug costs, increased eco-
nomic development, and promotion of regional and national eco-
nomic and intellectual property interests.  Yet strong regulation of 
parallel trade is necessary to ensure the safety of the parallel imports 
and reduce possible corruption of the system.  This will require af-
firmative work on the part of the AU and cooperation from devel-
oped countries.  The balance between intellectual property and mar-
ket forces in the pharmaceutical context hinges on a commitment to 
 
 226 See Glaxo Offers Cheaper AIDS Drugs, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1182652.stm (noting that as the Kenyan gov-
ernment prepared to introduce a bill that would allow the importation of cheap, ge-
neric HIV/AIDS drugs, the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline promised to 
heavily discount AIDS drugs). 
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improving public health.  Regional parallel trade in the AU offers an 
opportunity to further that commitment. 
1. Regional Parallel Trade as a Long-Term Solution 
Alongside Drug-Donation Programs to Lower Drug 
Costs in the African Union 
The establishment of parallel trade based on regional exhaus-
tion in the AU must be considered in light of other drug-price-
reduction measures.  Regional parallel trade will allow AU consumers 
to obtain drugs at lower costs by increasing market competition in 
African countries where drug costs are prohibitively high.  In addi-
tion, regional parallel trade in the AU could make up for the inade-
quacies in the compulsory licensing system, especially because many 
developed countries have been reluctant to put the August 30 Deci-
sion regarding paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration into action by 
producing low-cost drugs for export to developing countries.
227
  
Moreover, any profit cuts suffered by the pharmaceutical companies 
as a result of parallel trade within the AU would not devastate the 
drug industry.  The effect of reduced profits has been small in the 
EU,
228
 and drug companies do not typically patent their drugs in Afri-
ca.
229
  Many of the essential medicines needed in Africa are for diseas-
es that are far less prevalent in the developed world and would not 
likely provide pharmaceutical companies with large profits.
230
  Small 
reductions in profits are not a sufficient reason to discourage parallel 
trade in the AU. 
Although Western pharmaceutical companies would likely sur-
vive any profit cuts, they may respond to the adoption of parallel 
trade in the AU with a reluctance to participate in drug-donation 
programs.  Pharmaceutical companies have addressed the drug crisis 
by donating drugs to developing countries or relief organizations or 
by offering price discounts.
231
  Although some drug-donation pro-
grams have been successful, some companies have imposed stipula-
 
 227 See supra Part III.C (explaining the history behind the Doha Declaration).   
 228 Macarthur, supra note 79, at 9. 
 229 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1889. 
 230 See Dolmo, supra note 184, at 161 (“Developing world markets are a very small 
income source for the pharmaceutical industry.  The market represents only about 
10% of international sales and just 1.6% in the continent of Africa.”). 
 231 Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, AIDS WKLY., Apr. 17, 2000, at 18–19; see 
Albert I. Wertheimer et al., Successful Public/Private Donation Programs: A Review of the 
Diflucan Partnership Program in South Africa, 3 J. INT’L ASS’N PHYSICIANS AIDS CARE 74, 
74–76 (2004) (summarizing recent drug donation and price reduction initiatives by 
pharmaceutical companies).   
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tions on distribution of the donated drugs.
232
  Notably, however, a 
partnership between the drug company Pfizer and South Africa has 
received attention for its cooperative nature.
233
  In exchange for free 
donation of the drug Diflucan to treat cryptococcal meningitis, a 
brain infection that can occur in HIV patients, and registration of the 
drug by Pfizer according to South Africa’s requirements, the South 
African government agreed to monitor the storage and distribution 
of Pfizer’s drug to ensure it was properly administered, secured from 
theft, and provided to patients free of charge.
234
  The program’s suc-
cess is attributed to the established guidelines and this drug-donation 
program has expanded to other countries.
235
 
In light of pharmaceutical companies’ opposition to parallel im-
ports, they may cut their participation in drug-donation programs in 
protest to an established parallel trade system.  Parallel imports, how-
ever, are not bought or sold for free—they are the original drugs 
produced by pharmaceutical companies that have been placed on the 
market by the company.
236
  Therefore, parallel imports are separate 
from drug donations, which are primarily distributed through relief 
organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund or through a 
specified program, such as the Diflucan Partnership Program in 
South Africa.
237
  Notably, Pfizer was willing to establish a partnership 
with South Africa after South Africa implemented parallel trade,
238
 
which demonstrates that both solutions can coexist.  Moreover, paral-
lel trade is a long-term solution that does not require reliance on a 
donation program with an unknown duration.  Pharmaceutical com-
panies would still earn revenue from the drugs they initially placed 
 
 232 Henry & Lexchin, supra note 23, at 1590.  Drug-donation programs are not 
without their concerns.  An overall fear is that such programs are a means for phar-
maceutical companies to keep drug prices high worldwide while helping developing 
countries.  Id.  Doctors Without Borders takes the position that spending money on 
generic drug development would be a more sustained method of supplying drugs 
than donation programs.  Id. at 1590–91.  The WHO developed guidelines to ensure 
the safety of donated drugs.  Id. at 1591. 
 233 Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 78. 
 234 Id. at 76–77; Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, supra note 231, at 18–19. 
 235 Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 76–77. 
 236 See EURACTIV, supra note 25 (“[P]arallel trade only offers the original products 
of the industry itself . . . .”). 
 237 Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 74; Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, 
supra note 231, at 18–19. 
 238 South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amend-
ment Act in 1997.  Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 
1997, supra note 35.  The Diflucan Partnership Program was created in 2000.  Pfizer 
Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, supra note 231, at 18–19. 
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on the market.  Drug-donation programs are philanthropic measures 
and should not be used as a threat against the free-market competi-
tion that results from parallel trade. 
Another fear is that traders may use the donated drugs as paral-
lel imports in profiteering schemes, which also may stop pharmaceut-
ical companies from donating drugs.  Strong restrictions on the use 
of donated drugs as parallel imports will be required.  South Africa, 
in its partnership with Pfizer, has already shown a willingness to regu-
late the distribution of donated drugs.
239
  Similar regulations can be 
incorporated into the registration requirements for parallel imports.  
For example, in South Africa, as in the EU, traders must register the 
drug that they wish to import, provide information about the expor-
ter, and comply with repackaging criteria.
240
  These disclosure stipula-
tions can serve as safeguards against traders who attempt to repack-
age and sell donated drugs in African countries.  Strict guidelines for 
parallel imports would reassure pharmaceutical companies that do-
nated drugs will not become a part of parallel trade.  Drug-donation 
programs can work alongside the free competition inherent in paral-
lel trade to reduce drug costs in the AU. 
2. Parallel Trade Within the African Union as a Stimulus 
for Economic Growth 
A regional exhaustion system would encourage free trade and 
leverage economic development within Africa.  The EU system is flex-
ible enough to include new member countries and new drugs as it 
expands and similar growth could occur in the AU as it moves toward 
an integrated market.  Additionally, the efficiency of local production 
will increase.
241
  For example, the drug company Quality Chemical 
Industries Limited (QCIL) recently opened a plant to produce mala-
ria and antiretroviral drugs in Uganda.
242
  Because of a small market, 
 
 239 Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 76–77.  
 240 See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (outlining the parallel trade re-
quirements in South Africa). 
 241 See Harrelson, supra note 81, at 195 (“One attractive aspect of parallel import-
ing for many African nations is that they lack the local capacity to manufacture 
needed pharmaceuticals even if they require compulsory licensing.”). 
 242 Roger Bate, When Local Production Is Not the Answer, THE AMERICAN (Sept. 2, 
2009), http://www.american.com/archive/2009/september/bernarticle.2009-09-
01.0954500383.  
The Ugandan private market size is too small for QCIL to benefit from 
economies of scale, which means its prices are likely to be high. . . . 
QCIL cannot compete and probably never will. . . . QCIL wants a 15 
percent tariff against cheaper, quality-assured foreign drugs.  And 
QCIL is not alone; the rest of the industry in Uganda wants protection, 
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QCIL is unlikely to compete with foreign-produced drugs that are of-
fered at lower prices.
243
  Instead of each AU country trying to support 
its own producer, a regional parallel trade system could enable pro-
ducers in countries like Uganda to increase their market size and sell 
to other African countries within a REC without the fear of compet-
ing with imports from India.  Furthermore, in addition to working 
towards the goal of a common African market, strong regional coali-
tions promote strengthened representation of the coalition countries 
in the WTO.
244
  Regional exhaustion will contribute to strengthening 
the RECs economically. 
One of the reasons that the EU parallel trade system has en-
dured is because it is supported by strong political and judicial over-
sight.  Although the AU Commission, unlike the European Commis-
sion, does not have powers of its own,
245
 the AU could oversee a 
regional parallel trade system in other ways.  The Protocol on the Es-
tablishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights
246
 and 
the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union
247
 both es-
tablish judicial review options for implementing legal principles and 
resolving disputes and have jurisdiction over the RECs.
248
  The Pan 
African Parliament,
249
 charged with implementing AU policies and 
objectives, has law-making powers and could work to coordinate and 
harmonize health policy and intellectual property laws between 
 
for the same reasons as QCIL, as do producers in Ghana, Kenya, Tan-
zania, Nigeria, and the rest of the continent.  Tanzania has put in place 
a 10 percent tariff on [foreign] drug imports. 
Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 See Ryan L. Vinelli, Note, Bringing Down the Walls: How Technology Is Being Used to 
Thwart Parallel Importers Amid the International Confusion Concerning Exhaustion of Rights, 
17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 166 (2009). 
 245 See supra note 150 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the AU 
Commission).  
 246 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc.OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO(1) Rev.1 
(1997), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html. 
 247 Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, July 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.au.int/files/PROTOCOL_COURT_OF_JUSTICE_OF_THE_AFRICAN_
UNION.pdf. 
 248 Id. art. 19; Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples, supra note 246,  art. 3; Onzivu, supra note 222, at 160–
63. 
 249 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating 
to the Pan-African Parliament art. 2, Mar. 2, 2001, available at 
http://www.africanreview.org/docs/civsoc/pap.pdf. 
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member countries.
250
  As these entities are relatively young, their ca-
pabilities have yet to be fully tested.
251
  Looking to EU institutions as a 
model for promoting a common market could assist entities like the 
Pan African Parliament in regulating a regional parallel trade sys-
tem.
252
  Following South Africa and the EU, RECs could implement 
similar licensing and labeling requirements for importers within their 
region.  The relative success of RECs, such as the Economic Commu-
nity of the West African States, which has worked towards free trade 
and set up a regional health organization,
253
 demonstrates that re-
gional regulation is possible in the AU. 
Strong regulation of parallel trade by AU entities is necessary to 
establish and maintain the system.  AU countries, in implementing 
regional parallel trade, would have to ensure that the parallel imports 
did not make their way back to high-income markets, where traders 
could resell them at higher price to make a profit.
254
  Likewise, devel-
oped countries should ban parallel imports from developing coun-
tries to ensure that the drugs reach the intended recipients.
255
  Al-
though enforcement in both cases may prove difficult, preventing re-
importation is necessary to maintain “pro-poor” differential pricing.
256
  
The WTO has recognized that differential pricing between developed 
and developing countries helps promote access to affordable drugs in 
developing countries while encouraging continued research and de-
velopment of new drugs.
257
  Implementing parallel trade in the AU 
would remedy the significant price differences between developing 
African countries.  An AU regional parallel trade system is not meant, 
however, to address price differences between developed and devel-
oping countries that correspond to national wealth.  Such prices dif-
ferences enable pharmaceutical companies to provide lower-priced 
drugs to developing countries because of continued revenue from 
 
 250 Onzivu, supra note 222, at 163. 
 251 Id. at 160–63. 
 252 See Richard Frimpong Oppong, Private International Law in Africa: The Past, 
Present, and Future, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 715 (2007) (“The European Union juri-
sprudence may, however, become very useful in forging the African common market 
as envisaged under the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.”). 
 253 Onzivu, supra note 222, at 163–64. 
 254 Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1431–32. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIATS, REPORT OF THE 
WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS 2 (Apr. 8−11, 
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/ 
hosbjor_report_e.pdf. 
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developed countries.
258
  Therefore, parallel imports exchanged within 
the AU must not be exported to high-income countries.  This meas-
ure will ensure that the pricing scheme between developed and de-
veloping countries is not undermined.  A significant reduction in 
revenue from sales in developed countries would hinder the ability of 
pharmaceutical companies to offer drugs at lower prices in develop-
ing countries and only worsen the drug crisis in Africa. 
Moreover, robust oversight is needed in the AU to prevent cor-
ruption of the free-trade market that grows with a parallel-import re-
gime.  Strict regulations are necessary to prevent a parallel-import in-
dustry built on counterfeit drugs and to reduce safety concerns over 
drug tampering.  The risk of consuming unsafe drugs would seriously 
inhibit the parallel trade system.  Another concern, which reflects the 
price differential issue discussed above, is that government officials 
may attempt to create a secondary market by diverting cheap parallel 
imports to wealthy countries for profit.  Although such activity is dif-
ficult to predict, perhaps the best proof that a parallel trade regime 
in Africa can thrive is illustrated through South Africa’s adoption of 
parallel trade for the chief purpose of increasing access to affordable 
drugs and improving the health of its citizens.  Although concerns 
over corruption reflect the high stakes that accompany implementa-
tion of free trade in the AU, the overwhelming need for affordable 
drugs is a strong impetus for AU entities to create regulations that 
promote the success of parallel trade. 
3. Using Regional Parallel Trade to Shape Intellectual 
Property Protection in the Best Interests of the African 
Union 
Developing countries in Africa have the opportunity to define or 
redefine their patent regimes because developing countries have un-
til 2016 to become TRIPS compliant and offer pharmaceutical pa-
tents.
259
  Although many African countries have established patent re-
gimes,
260
 intellectual property protection is not strongly regarded in 
Africa, evidenced by the fact that many developed-world drug com-
panies do not apply for patents in Africa.
261
  Becoming TRIPS com-
pliant is an opportunity for governments to determine what degree of 
 
 258 See Henry & Lexchin, supra note 23, at 1594.  
 259 Press Release, World Trade Org., supra note 31. 
 260 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (listing a sample of African countries 
with patent acts). 
 261 See Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1889 (finding that many anti-
retroviral drugs are not patented in Africa). 
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intellectual property protection they want to offer to best meet their 
domestic needs.  Intellectual property regimes are an important as-
pect of a common economic community and can ultimately lead to 
stronger international presence and facilitate free trade and market 
integration. 
As developing countries attempt to define the contours of their 
intellectual property systems, the difficulty in balancing the goals of 
such a system against a humanitarian crisis is apparent.  A respectable 
patent-law system affords adequate protection to inventors.  But with 
such protection comes reluctance on the part of the patent holder to 
give up the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the product.  As 
such, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, many developing countries had 
weak patent regimes because they felt that strong patent protection 
favored foreigners at the expense of local producers.
262
  This concern 
is questionable in light of the fact that many pharmaceutical compa-
nies do not patent drugs in Africa.
263
  Furthermore, there is a growing 
consensus that countries with strong intellectual property systems at-
tract more foreign direct investment than countries without such sys-
tems.
264
  Facilitating regional parallel trade in the AU could be a first 
step towards creating a robust intellectual property regime that pri-
oritizes the needs of local consumers, particularly in light of the pub-
lic health crisis.  Adopting the doctrine of regional exhaustion in the 
AU would give notice to industries in developed countries that an es-
tablished intellectual property regime exists in Africa.  Moreover, as 
in the EU, regional exhaustion in the AU would mean parallel im-
ports from outside the region are not permitted and thus an assured 
degree of intellectual property protection is provided.  Regional ex-
haustion in the AU would reflect the need for affordable drugs and 
the value in respecting intellectual property rights. 
 
 262 Harrelson, supra note 81, at 179. 
 263 Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 142, at 1889. 
 264 Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 218.  For insight into the effect of 
changing intellectual property law, see Ghosh, supra note 190, at 816–17.  Brazil 
enacted patent legislation in 1996 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.  Id. at 816.  
But “the legislation exempts patent protection for anything that was commercialized 
anywhere in the world prior to May 14, 1997.”  Id.  Therefore, patentees who sold 
their patented goods anywhere in the world prior to May 14, 1997 have exhausted 
their rights.  Id.  As a result, the price of drugs with no generic equivalent in Brazil 
dropped 9% from 1996 to 2000 and the price of drugs with generic equivalents 
manufactured in Brazil dropped 79%.  Id.  Brazil’s model may not be an option for 
some African countries (for countries that already have patent laws, retroactive legis-
lation would not be helpful), but parallel trade may be an effective option.  Id. at 
816–17. 
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Implementing regional exhaustion in the AU is unlikely to occur 
without controversy from the intellectual property law community.  
The Revised Bangui Agreement, which governs African countries par-
ticipating in the African Intellectual Property Organization, has, in 
essence, created a microcosm of a regional parallel trade system in 
Africa.  International organizations, however, expressed criticism be-
cause of the restrictive approach in prohibiting parallel imports from 
outside the OAPI region.
265
  Given these concerns and the fact that 
countries like South Africa already import drugs from outside Afri-
ca,
266
 regional parallel trade should act only as a supplementary 
means of bringing affordable drugs to Africa.  Africa must not isolate 
itself with respect to any solution implemented to address the public 
health crisis.  Significant cooperation within Africa as a continent 
and, most importantly, with developed countries is needed.  Al-
though regionalism is an efficient means of promoting public health 
within a group of select countries, any approach taken must be flexi-
ble and adaptable to the changing needs of AU consumers and ac-
commodate the goal of a common African market.
267
  Regional paral-
lel trade contributes to this goal by reducing drug costs in countries 
where it is most needed and shaping market forces and intellectual 
property law to best serve the interests of the AU. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion should be 
implemented in the AU.  The AU has a strong desire for cohesion 
and a unified economic market—factors that motivated the EU to 
adopt a functioning, enduring parallel trade system.  Africa already 
has created RECs to promote the free-trade movement.  An even 
stronger reason for regional parallel trade than existed in the EU is 
present in the AU—the need for essential drugs.  Although many po-
litical, social, and economic factors must be considered, reviewing the 
 
 265 See generally COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 161 (“[The Re-
vised Bangui Agreement] does not explicitly allow parallel imports . . . .”); World 
Health Org., supra note 158, at 35 (expressing concern over the strict conditions on 
intellectual property in the Revised Bangui Agreement); Sell, supra note 159, at 385–
86 (characterizing the Revised Bangui Agreement “Trips Plus”); Press Release, 
Médecins San Frontières, supra note 157 (explaining the objections of the WHO and 
Doctors Without Borders to the Revised Bangui Agreement). 
 266 Kenya has also adopted international exhaustion.  See Shianya, supra note 8.  
 267 Onzivu, supra note 222, at 186 (“It is important that developing countries ac-
tively participate in inter-national law and policy making to promote the public 
health of their people.  However, the way forward for developing countries is to work 
to ensure that the new regionalism in which they participate fully meets the health 
goals of member states.”). 
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drug crisis from the perspective of patent law and drawing on the EU 
experience demonstrates that a similar system has the potential to 
work in Africa.  Significant price differences exist between drugs in 
African countries.  Parallel trade on a regional level can address this 
situation by increasing free-market competition and lowering drug 
costs.  The AU is in the process of developing and strengthening go-
verning entities that can serve to regulate such a system.  Now is the 
time to strike a balance between health policy and intellectual prop-
erty law that truly works in the best interests of the AU. 
The pharmaceutical drug crisis in Africa calls for comprehensive 
consideration of all potential solutions.  Importantly, any solution 
must be considered primarily from the perspective of African con-
sumers.  With respect to parallel trade, the current focus is on the 
negative aspects of international exhaustion.  But policymakers and 
scholars should fully consider regional exhaustion as well.  The paral-
lel-import market only shows signs of growing in the EU.  Outside the 
EU, parallel trade is becoming increasingly common as countries like 
India expand their manufacturing capabilities and countries like 
South Africa, desperate for essential medicines, attempt to leverage 
this trade mechanism.  Instead of looking outside the continent, Afri-
ca is a potential arena for a parallel trade system based on regional 
exhaustion.  Regional parallel trade could play an important role in 
increasing access to pharmaceutical drugs and, coupled with contin-
ued international support, could provide another piece of the puzzle 
to alleviate the drug crisis in Africa. 
 
